Due Process Limitations on
Victim Impact Evidence by Engle, Matthew L.
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 4
Fall 9-1-2000
Due Process Limitations on Victim Impact
Evidence
Matthew L. Engle
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew L. Engle, Due Process Limitations on Victim Impact Evidence, 13 Cap. DEF J. 55 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol13/iss1/4




There is perhaps no more damaging type of testimony at a sentencing
hearing than that of a surviving parent, child, sibling or spouse describing
the senses of grief and loss that inevitably result from the sudden and violent
loss of a loved one. Victim impact testimony is not only highly emotional
and visceral by nature; it is also virtually unimpeachable and irrefutable.'
Thus, a capital defense attorney who is confronted with victim impact
testimony finds herself in a no-win situation. She may choose simply to
ignore the testimony and hope that its effect on the fact-finder will not be
too prejudicial.2 Otherwise, she is left with the unpalatable alternative ofimpugning the decedent's character and attempting to minimize the loss felt
by the survivors.
* J.D. candidate, May 2001, Washington & Lee Universiy School of Law; B.A.,
Cleveland State University. Thanks to my parents, my sister andespecially to my wife,
Victoria. Thanks also to Professor Roger D. Groot and all of the members of the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse.
1. For example, in 1995 Judge Michael Luttig of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit testified in Texas at the sentencing phase of Napolean Beazley's
murder trial. Beazley had been convicted of the murder of Judge Luttig's father, john. In
his testimony, Judge Luttig told the Texas court that his father had been "a man of great
integrity," the Judge's "hero" and "best friend." Judge Luttig also requested that Beazley be
sentenced to death. Laura LaFay, Prejudice From the Bench?, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS, Nov. 10, 1996, at B-1, available in 1996 WL 6060065. Any challenge to this testimony
could only offend the fact-finder (Didn't your father really lack integrity, Judge Luttig? Isn't
it true that he was not, in fact, your hero?). Similarly, it is difficult to imagine any evidence
that could be offered to refute this testimony without seriously alienating the judge or jury
and increasing the grief of the survivor.
2. It is, of course, possible and highly desirable for defense attorneys to take steps to
minimize the prejudicial effect of victim impact testimony. These worthwhile tactical
considerations are outside the scope of this article, which instead focuses upon limiting or
excluding this testimony. For suggestions on how to use voir dire and jury instructions to
neutralize victim impact testimony, see Michael Ogul, Dealing with Victim Impact Evidence
(Part 2), THE CHAMPION, Aug./Sept. 2000, at 42.
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Until 1991, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution prohibited the admission of victim impact testimony at
the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial? However, in Payne v. Tennes-
see4 the United States Supreme Court reversed itself and held that "if the
State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prose-
cutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se
bar."' In its own post-Payne jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Virginia
has never seriously treated the admissibility of victim impact testimony.
Instead, in a series of decisions notable for their uniform want of analysis,
the court has flatly declared that victim impact testimony is admissible
because Payne makes it so.6 Furthermore, the Virginia General Assembly
has endorsed the admission of victim impact testimony at capital sentencing
hearings!
The purpose of this article is to debunk the myth that Payne abolished
all constitutional barriers to the admission of victim impact testimony. In
fact, every Justice in the Payne majority recognized a constitutional limit to
the use of this type of evidence! Accordingly, this article will suggest that
3. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987) (holding that the admission of victim
impact testimony at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial violates the Eighth
Amendment), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 (1991). The complete text
of the Eighth Amendment states as follows: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend.
VIII. The protection against cruel and unusual punishments has been incorporated to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660,675 (1962) (stating that the Eighth Amendment "is applicable to the
States by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also Louisi-
ana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (stating that "[t]he Fourteenth
[Amendment] would prohibit by its due process clause execution by a state in a cruel
manner").
4. 501 U.s. 808 (1991).
5. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
6. See Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898, 904 (Va. 1997) (holding that the
admissibility of victim impact evidence "is limited only by the relevance of such evidence to
show the impact of the defendant's actions'); see also Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d
379, 389 (Va. 1994) (holding that "victim impact testimony is relevant to punishment in a
capital murder prosecution in Virginia").
7. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A1) (Michie 2000). Section 19.2-264.4(A1)
provides that in a capital sentencing hearing "the court shall permit the victim, as defined in
S 19.2-11.01, upon the motion of the attorney for the Commonwealth, and with the consent
of the victim, to testify in the presence of the accused regarding the impact of the offense
upon the victim.* Id.
8. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that "[i]n the
event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial funda-
mentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mecha-
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defense attorneys should continue to seek to exclude victim impact testi-
mony on the basis of fundamental fairness. The contours of the Virginia
capital sentencing scheme will be explored in some detail to bolster the
argument that victim impact testimony is not relevant to any of the aggra-
vating or mitigating factors that the jury will consider. The prejudicial
effect of this evidence will be emphasized. Perhaps most importantly, this
article will closely examine the testimony of which Payne approved, and will
argue that most victim impact testimony is less relevant and more prejudi-
cial than that of Payne. By accentuating these points it may be possible to
curtail, if not to prevent, the Commonwealth's use of victim impact testi-
mony in capital sentencing hearings.
IL Payne v. Tennessee
A. The (Actual) Holding
In order to appreciate fully the changes brought about by Payne, it is
necessary to consider briefly the state of the constitutional law with regard
to victim impact evidence immediately prior to that decision. In 1986, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on a direct appeal from a
Maryland death sentence.9 John Booth ("Booth") had been convicted of the
first-degree murders of Irvin and Rose Bronstein.1" In accordance with
Maryland law, a pre-sentence report containing a victim impact statement
was prepared and presented to the jury at the sentencing hearing." The
statement, which was read to the jury by the prosecutor, was based upon
interviews with the decedents' son,'daughter, son-in-law, and granddaugh-
ter.12 The statement recited the decedents' admirable personal qualities and
nism for relief." Id. In addition, Justice O'Connor, writing for three Justices, stated "[w]e do
not hold today that victim impact evidence must be admitted, odr even that it should be
admitted. We hold merely that if a State decides to permit consideration of this evidence, the
Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar." Id. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, Justice Souter wrote separately and
emphasized "the trial judge's authority and responsibility to control the proceedings consis-
tently with due process, on which ground defendants may object and, if necessary, appeal."
Id. at 836 (Souter, J., concurring).
9. SeeBooth v. Maryland, 479 U.S. 882 (1986) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
10. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,498 (1987). The evidence showed that Booth and
his co-defendant, Willie Reid, had broken into the Bronsteins' home and stolen money in
order to buy heroin. Because Booth knew that the Bronsteins could identify him, the co-
defendants bound and gagged the elderly couple and stabbed them to death with a kitchen
knife. The Bronsteins' son discovered their bodies two days after the attack. Id. at 497-98.
11. Id. at 498.
12. Id. at 499.
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described the emotional and personal problems the family members faced
after the crimes." In addition, the statement contained the daughter's
assertion that she could never forgive Booth and her opinion that he could
never be rehabilitated.
4
The Court reversed Booth's death sentence and held that the use of the
victim impact statement violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment." The Court based its holding on two
findings. First, the Court found that the evidence violated the Eighth
Amendment requirement that a capital sentencing jury focus on the defen-
dant as a "uniquely individual human being." 6 The Court noted that the
"focus of a [victim impact statement]... is not on the defendant, but on the
character and reputation of the victim and the effect on his family."17
Because these factors are "wholly unrelated" to a defendant's moral blame-
worthiness, the Court concluded that the evidence ,ould impermissibly
divert the jury's attention away from its constitutionally mandated inquiry
into the defendant's background and record. 8 Second, the Court found that
the evidence violated the Eighth Amendment because it failed to provide a
"principled way" for juries to determine whether to impose a sentence of
death.' Instead, the Court opined that the introduction of this evidence
would lead to a disproportionate number of death sentences in cases in
which "a family is willing and able to express its grief," which the Court
characterized as an "arbitrary" basis for the imposition of the death
penalty.20
Four years later, the Supreme Court decided to hear Payne v. Tennessee.
In that case, Pervis Tyrone Payne ("Payne") was convicted of the first-degree
murders of twenty-eight-year-old Charisse Christopher ("Christopher") and
her two-year-old daughter, Lacie.' In addition, Payne was convicted of
assaulting Christopher's three-year-old son, Nicholas, with the intent to
commit first-degree murder.22 At the sentencing hearing, the State intro-
duced the testimony of Christopher's mother, Mary Zvolanek, who de-
13. Id. at 499-500.
14. Id. at 500.
15. Id. at 509; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
16. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)
(plurality opinion)).
17. Id. at 504.
18. Id. at 504-05.
19. Id. at 506 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,433 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
20. Id. at 505.




scribed how Nicholas had been affected by the murders of his mother and
sister.23 Furthermore, during closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that
the jury should impose a death sentence "for Nicholas" and further de-
scribed the impact that the killings would have on his life."' The jury
sentenced Payne to death on both of the murder counts." After the Su-
preme Court of Tennessee affirmed the death sentences, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari "to reconsider [the] holdings [of] Booth
and Gathers that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a capital sentencing jury
from considering 'victim impact' evidence relating to the personal character-
istics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crimes on the victim's
family."
26
The Payne majority considered both of the bases upon which Booth had
invalidated victim impact testimony and rejected each in turn. The Court
tacitly conceded that victim impact testimony is not relevant to a defen-
dant's moral blameworthiness, but held that it is relevant on another
theory. Victim impact evidence, according to the Court, is "designed to
23. Id. at 814-15. Mary Zvolanek testified as follows:
[Nicholas] cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she
doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister Lade. He comes to me
many times during the week and asks me, Gr m do you miss my
cae. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm worried about my Lacie.
Id. This was the entirety of the victim impact testimony in Payne.
24. Id. at 815.
25. Id. at 816.
26. Id. at 817. In addition to overruling Booth, Payne overruled South Carolina v.
Gathen, which had extended the Eighth Amendment prohibition of victim impact evidence
to prosecutorial argument regarding the personal qualities of a homicide victim. South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811 (1989) (stating '[wihile in this case it was the prosecu-
tor rather than the victim's survivors who characterized the victim's personal qualities, the
statement is indistinguishable in any relevant respect from that in Booth"), over!ed by
Payne, 501 U.S. at 830. While this article focuses solely on the admissibility of victim impact
evidence, it assumes that due process limits prosecutorial argument to precisely the same
extent that it limits evidence. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
"[i)f in a particular case, a witness' testimony ora prosecutor's remark so infects the sentencing
proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant may seek appropriate relief
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment") (emphasis added).
27. Payne, 501 U.S. at 819. In fact, the Court (correctly) acknowledged that moral
blameworthiness itself is often not a factor of primary relevance to sentencing. In support
of this proposition, the Court gave the following example: 'If a bank robber aims his gun at
a guard, pulls the trigger, and kills his target, he may be put to death. If the gun unexpectedly
misfires, he may not. His moral guilt in both cases is identical, but his responsibility in the
former is greater." Id. (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Thus, the Court
reasoned that factors other than moral blameworthiness must account for sentence variances.
Nonetheless, apparently unpersuaded by its own logic, the Court later announced that it was"now of the view that a State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully
2000]
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portray for the sentencing authority the actual harm caused by a particular
crime."2" Citing the Book of Exodus and a legal treatise on white collar
crime, the Court held that the harm caused by a crime is relevant to sentenc-
ing "as a prerequisite to criminal sanction" and "as a standard for determin-
ing the severity of the sentence that will be meted out."2 In response to the
second holding of Booth, that victim impact testimony violates the Eighth
Amendment by leading to arbitrary death sentences based upon the surviv-
ing family's ability and willingness to express its grief, the Court flatly
asserted that
[a]s a general matter. . . victim impact evidence is not offered to
encourage comparative judgments of this kind - for instance, that
the killer of a hardworkinig, devoted parent deserves the death
penalty, but that the murderer of a reprobate does not. It is de-
signed to show instead each victim's "uniqueness as an individual
human being," whatever the jury might think the loss to the
community resulting from his death might be.3"
Finally, the Court found that the State has a right to present victim impact
testimony in order to "counteract" the mitigating evidence presented by the
defendant "by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be
considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death
represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family."3'
the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the
sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant." Id. at 825. Of
course, these two positions are completely inconsistent with one another.
28. Id. at 821.
29. Id. at 820 (quoting STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITLING IN JUDGMENT: THE
SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 56 (1988)); see also Exodus 21:23-24 (Revised
Standard Version) (stating "[i]f any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye,
tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot"). The Court mistakenly cited to verses 22-23
of Exodus 21, and misquoted the Lex talionis as l[a]n eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."
Payne, 501 U.S. at 819.
30. Payne, 501 U.S. at 823 (internal quotation omitted in original).
31. Id. at 825 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting)). If by "counteract"
the Court meant rebut," then it was surely mistaken. Victim impact evidence does not rebut
mitigation evidence because it does not bear on the defendant's character, prior record, or the
circumstances of the offense. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 n.12 (1978) (recognizing
the "traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the
defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense"). However, the
dissenting opinion of Justice White in Booth indicates that "counteract" has a more abstract
meaning. Booth, 482 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting) (stating "[m]any if not most jurors.
.will look less favorably on a capital defendant when they appreciate the full extent of the
harm he caused, including the harm to the victim's family"). If the constitutional mandate
that capital punishment schemes must apply the law "in a manner that avoids the arbitrary
[Vol. 13:1
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Thus, in its historical context, Payne is nothing more than a rejection
of the two specific Booth holdings that victim impact evidence (1)
inpermissibly diverts the jury's attention away from the defendant's back-
ground, record, and moral blameworthiness and (2) results in arbitrary death
sentences based upon the surviving family's ability and willingness to
express its grief. In addition, Payne stands for the proposition that victim
impact testimony is relevant as "another form or method of informing the
sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in ques-
tion." 2 However, Payne does not establish that the specific harm caused by
the crime is relevant in any particular capital sentencing scheme,33 nor does
it foreclose the possibility of some constitutional limit on the presentation
of victim impact evidence. In fact, the Payne Court specifically identified
such a limitation. 4
B. Payne and Due Process as a Limitation on the Admissibility of
Victim Impact Evidence
In holding that victim impact evidence is not per se violative of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Payne majority
specifically identified the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
as the appropriate mechanism for relief."5 Furthermore, both of the concur-
ring opinions emphasized this point. Justice O'Connor wrote the follow-
ing:
and capricious infliction of the death penalty" means anything, it must mean that juries
cannot recommend a death sentence simply because they do not "look favorably upon the
defendant. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (plurality opinion) (recognizing
that "the penalty of death may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a
substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner");
seealso Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (stating that a jury's
"discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (opinion of
White, J.) (stating that a capital sentencing scheme must provide a "meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not").
32. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
33. Id. The Court emphasized that evidence of harm has 'long [been] considered by
sentencing authorities." Id. However, the Court did not discuss the Maryland capital
sentencing scheme or state any theory of relevance to any aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance in that scheme.
34. See infra Part 11(B).
35. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (stating "[i]n the event that evidence is introduced that is so
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief"); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2000]
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We do not hold today that victim impact evidence must be admit-
ted, or even that it should be admitted. We hold merely that if a
State decides to permit consideration of this evidence, the Eighth
Amendment erects no per se bar. If, in a particular case, a witness'
testimony or a prosecutor's remark so infects the sentencing
proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant
may seek appropriate relief under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 6
Also, Justice Souter referred to "the trial judge's authority and responsibility
to control the proceedings consistently with due process, on which ground
defendants may object, and if necessary, appeal. '"37 It is clear from these
quotations that due process prohibits the introduction of victim impact
evidence when the admission of this evidence would render the sentencing
proceeding fundamentally unfair. 8
Justice O'Connor's concurrence also demonstrated that the promise of
review under the Due Process Clause was not merely illusory. Her opinion,
which was joined by Justices White and Kennedy, contained due process
analysis which provides a framework for challenges to victim impact evi-
dence.3 Two factors were central to Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the
evidence admitted in Payne did not render the sentencing hearing fundamen-
tally unfair. First, Justice O'Connor emphasized the brevity of the Payne
testimony.
The State called as a witness Mary Zvolanek, Nicholas'
grandmother. Her testimony was brief. She explained that Nich-
olas cried for his mother andbaby sister and could not understand
why they did not come home. I do not doubt that the jurors were
moved by this testimony- who would not have been? But surely
this brief statement did not inflame their passions more than did
the facts of the crime.'
36. Payne, 501 U.S. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
37. Id. at 836 (Souter, J., concurring).
38. The Court cited Darden v. Wainwright as authority for its holding that due process
provides relief for fundamental unfairness. Id. at 825 (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168, 179-83 (1986)). Darden stated that a prosecutor's argument is improper if it "so infect[s)
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden,
477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). Thus, the
standard for fundamental fairness is perfectly circular; due process prohibits the admission
of evidence that would render the trial fundamentally unfair, which is established if the
evidence is so unfair that it amounts to a violation of due process.
39. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 831-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra note 23 (quoting entire text of the victim
impact testimony in Payne).
[Vol. 13:1
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Second, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the jury was already familiar
with the impact of the offense upon Nicholas because of testimony that had
been presented at the guilt phase of the trial:
Charisse Christopher was stabbed 41 times with a butcher knife
and bled to death; her 2-year-old daughter Lacie was killed by
repeated thrusts of that same knife; and 3-year-old Nicholas,
despite stab wounds that penetrated completely through his body
from front to back survived - only to witness the brutal murders
of his mother and baby sister. In light of the jury's unavoidable
familiarity with the facts of Payne's vicious attack I cannot con-
clude that the additional information provided by Mary
Zvolanek's testimony deprived petitioner of due process."1
Thus, injustice O'Connor's view, the fact that the victim impact testimony
was redundant and cumulative decreased its prejudicial effect.2 The sub-
stance of the victim impact testimony in Payne involved the impact of the
killings on three-year-old Nicholas.' Because Nicholas had been physically
present at the commission of the offense, the evidence presented at the guilt
phase necessarily involved the impact of the crime upon him. Therefore,
the jury's "unavoidable familiarity" with the facts of Payne made the victim
impact testimony repetitive, lessening the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant. Based upon these factors, justice O'Connor concluded that "[a]s
to the victim impact evidence that was introduced, its admission did not violate
the Constitution.""
III. The Use of Victim Impact Evidence in
Virginia Capital Sentencing Hearings
The greatest shortcoming of Payne is its failure to state the relevance of
victim impact evidence to any particular capital sentencing scheme. While
Payne did convincingly demonstrate that this type of evidence can be used
to demonstrate the actual harm and loss that result from an offense, its
analysis was incomplete in that it did not explain how harm or loss is
relevant to any of the issues involved in a given capital sentencing system.
In fact, a close examination of the Virginia capital sentencing procedure will
41. Payne, 501 U.S. at 832 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
43. See supra note 23 (quoting entire text of the victim impact testimony in Payne).
44. Payne, 501 U.S. at 833 (O'Connor;J., concurring) (emphasis added). Far from being
a blanket endorsement for the admission of all victim impact evidence, this conclusion is




illustrate that evidence about the degree of harm or loss caused by the crime
is not relevant to the determinations that the jury is required, by statute, to
make.
45
A. The Virginia Capital Sentencing Scheme
Once a defendant has been convicted of capital murder, a sentencing
proceeding is held in order to determine whether he should be sentenced to
life in prison or to death.4 Section 19.2-264.2 of the Virginia Code states
that:
[i]n assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for
which the death penalty may be imposed, a.sentence of death shall
not be imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after consider-
ation of the past criminal record of convictions of the defendant,
find that there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing seri-
ous threat to society or that his conduct in committing the offense
for which he stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind
or an aggravated battery to the victim; and (2) recommend that the
penalty of death be imposed.4'
Thus, before a defendant can be sentenced to death, the jury must find that
the Commonwealth has proven either the future dangerousness a~gravator
or the vileness aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt." It is not, however,
mandatory for the jury to impose a death sentence once it has found that an
aggravating circumstance has been proven; the jury must also consider the
defendant's evidence in mitigation of the offense before making its sentence
recommendation.49
45. See infra Part (A).
46. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A) (Michie 2000); see VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31
(Michie 2000) (defining the offense of capital murder).
47. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000).
48. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2000) (stating "[tlhe penalty
of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable
doubt" that one of the aggravating circumstances exist).
49. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B). The statutory verdict form also makes dear
that the jury must consider the defendant's mitigation evidence before making a sentence
recommendation:
The verdict of the jury shall be in writing, and in one of the following forms:
(1) We, the jury, on the issue joine, hia found the defendant guilty of
(here set out statutory language of te offense c ed) and that (after consider-
ation of his prior history tat there is a probability that he would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to
society) or his conduct in committing the offense is outrageously or wantonly
[Vol. 13:1"*
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1. Future Dangerousness
Future dangerousness is the less conceptually difficult of the aggrava-
tors. It is by definition a prospective inquiry; the jury is directed to look
into the future and predict whether the defendant is likely to commit crimes
of violence. The express language of section 19.2-264.2 permits the jury to
consider "the past criminal record of convictions of the defendant" in
making this inquiry.' Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Virginia has held
that the jury may consider not only convictions but also prior unadjudicated
criminal acts,"1 the circumstances of the offense, 2 and the heinousness of the
crime" when making the future dangerousness determination. 4 Thus, even
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved (torture) (depravity of mind) (aura-
vated battery to the vi.ctim),and&avingconsidered thedience in mitigatin of the
offense, unanimously fix his punishment at death.
Signed ..................... foreman"
or
(2) "We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty
of (here set out statutory language of the offense charged) and having considered
allo/the evidence in awgravation and mitigation ofsuch offense, fix his punishment
at imprisonment forTfe.
Signed ...................... foreman"
VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(D) (Michie 2000) (emphases added).
50. S 19.2-264.2.
51. See Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 571 (Va. 1999) (citing Pruett v.
Commonwealth, 351 S.E.2d 1, 11-12 (Va. 1986)) (stating that "evidence of violent criminal
conduct, whether or not adjudicated, is relevant to the determination of a defendant's future
dangerousness because it has a tendency to show that the accused would commit criminal acts
of violence in the future").
52. See Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 807,813 (Va. 1985). In so holding, the
Edmonds court relied on the language of S 19.2-264.4(B) which states that the court should
admit "any matter which the court deems relevant to sentence." Id. (quoting 5 19.2-264.4(B)).
However, the court's reliance on S 19.2-264.4(B) was misplaced; that section addresses the
admissibility of evidence in mitigation of an offense, not evidence in aggravation of an
offense.
53. See Quintana v. Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643,655 (Va. 1982) (stating "[a]s to the
factor that defendant Will pose a continuing serious threat to society, we need only refer again
to the heinous circumstances surrounding this homicide, committed upon a 72-year-old
woman during the course of a robbery").
54. The Supreme Court of Virginia has cited S 19.2-264.4(C) in allowing evidence about
the circumstances of the crime to be used to prove future dangerousness. See Edmonds, 329
S.E.2d at 813. That section states that
[t]he penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth
shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability basedupon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circum-stances surrounding the commission of the offense of which he is accused
that he would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his
conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman, n n that it involved torture, 
depravity of mnd or
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though the Supreme Court of Virginia has been extraordinarily liberal and
permissive with regard to the types of evidence it has allowed the Common-
wealth to present as proof of future dangerousness, this evidence is limited
to the defendant's background and his conduct during the commission of
the offense.
2. Vileness
Vileness is the more abstract of the two aggravating circumstances. The
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant's "conduct in committing
the offense ... was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the
victim."5 The United States Supreme Court has given a qualified endorse-
ment to this a ggravator. s However, the Court has also recognized that the
Constitution limits the use of vileness as an aggravator; in Godfrey v. Geor-
gia,57 the Supreme Court reversed a Georgia death sentence that was im-
posed pursuant to a jury finding of vileness because the Georgia courts had
applied an unconstitutionally broad construction of this aggravator.5 ' The
Court wrote
[i]n the case before us the Georgia Supreme Court has affirmed a
sentence of death based upon no more than a finding that the
offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or ihuman."
ateravated battery to the victim.
VA. CODE-ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (.ichie 2000). To the extent that this section can be read
to permit both the prior history of the defendant and the circumstances of the offense to be
used to prove future dan erousness, it is flatly inconsistent with S 19.2-264.2, which permits
the consideration of a defendant's history of convictions only to prove future dangerousness
and the consideration of the circumstances of the offense only to prove vileness. See supra
note 47 and accompanying text. In addition, the statutory verdict form codified at S 19.2-
264.4(D) supports the argument that only the defendant's criminal history can be used to
prove future dangerousness. See supra note 49. For further analysis, see Jason J. Solomon,
Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 59-66 (1999).
55. VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000).
56. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,200-01 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (rejecting
defendant's claim that an identical Georgi a avator was "so broad and vague as to leave
juries free to act as arbitrarily and capricious y as they wish in deciding whether to impose
the death penalty" in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). The Court held
that the Georgia aggravator, as it bad been interpreted and applied by the Georgia Supreme
Court in that case, was constitutional- Id. (stating that 'there is no reason to assume that the
Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction" of the vileness
aggravator as to permit it to be imposed in any murder case).
57. 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality opinion).
58. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (stating that "if a
state wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and
apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
penalty").
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There is nothing in these few words, standing alone, that implies
any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of
the death sentence.5 9
Therefore, in order to be constitutionally adequate, the vileness aggravator
must be applied in a manner that provides a "meaningful basis for distin-
guishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not."' Distinguishing earlier Georgia cases that had
applied the vileness aggravator constitutionally, the Court concluded that
these opinions
suggest[ed] that the Georgia Supreme Court had by 1977 reached
three separate but consistent conclusions respecting the [vileness]
aggravating circumstance. The first was that the evidence that the
offense was -outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman"
had to demonstrate "torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim." The second was that the phrase "epravity
of mind," comprehended only the kind of mental state thatled the
murderer to torture or to commit an aggravated battery before
killing his victim. The third... was that the word, "torture,"
must be construed in pari materia with "aggravated battery" so as
to require evidence of serious physical abuse of the victim before
death.61
Thus, Godfrey made clear that the Georgia vileness aggravator was constitu-
tionally permissible only so long as it required proof of torture, depravity
of mind, or aggravated battery to the victim. When the finding of vileness
was not predicated on one of these underlying facts, the Supreme Court held
that the aggravator was unconstitutionally vague. '
The Virginia vileness aggravator, like that of Georgia, is limited to cases
in which the evidence proves torture, depravity of mind or aggravated
battery to the victim.6" Under Godfrey, the Commonwealth is not permit-
ted to ignore the language of section 19.2-264.4(C), which limits the use of
the vileness aggravator to cases involving at least one of these sub-elements.
Thus, any evidence of vileness that does not address one of these sub-ele-
59. Id.
60. Id. at 427 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (opinion of Stewart, J.) (quoting Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring))).
61. Id. at 431 (discussing Blake v. State, 236 S.E.2d 637 (Ga. 1977); Harris v. State, 230
S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1976)).
62. Id. at 428.
63. SeeVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2000). Torture, depravity of mind and




ments is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.' Accordingly, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution prohibit the Virginia courts from disregarding
the limitations that the General Assembly has placed upon the vileness
aggravator. Therefore, evidence can only be relevant to a determination of
vileness if it is relevant to one or more of the vileness sub-elements. For this
reason, it is essential to understand the types of evidence that have been held
to be probative of torture, depravity of mind, and aggravated battery to the
victim.
a. Torture
Torture is the least used and consequently the least defined of the
vileness sub-elements. 5 However, according to Black's Law Dictionary,
torture is the infliction of "intense pain to the body or mind to punish, to
extract a confession or information, or to obtain sadistic pleasure."6 Thus,
torture involves proof that the defendant inflicted pain upon the victim
during the commission of the capital offense and proof of his motivation for
doing so.
One of the only cases in which the Supreme Court of Virginia has
discussed the concept of torture is Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth.' In that
case, the defendant raped and sodomized the victim before stabbing and
slashing her to death as she begged him to "please just blow [her] brains out
and get it over with."" In conducting its statutorily-mandated proportional-
64. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text; see aLso Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428.
Thus, while Payne establishes that the Eighth Amendment does not bar the use of victim
impact evidence per se, it may bar the use of victim impact testimony to prove vileness.
Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
65. See Douglas R. Banghart, Videness: Issues andAnalysis, 12 CAP. DEF.J. 77,80 (1999).
There are two possible explanations for the dearth of Virginia death sentences predicated
upon findings of torture. The first is that no Virginia murder cases have involved torture.
The second (and more likely) explanation is that Virginia prosecutors have avoided basing
their vileness arguments on the torture sub-element. If prosecutors are in fact avoiding the
torture sub-element, this could be because torture involves the goal-directed infliction of pain.
In other words, the Commonwealth may have to prove that the defendant inflicted pain
upon the victim for a specific purpose. See infta note 66 and accompanying text. Alterna-
tively, it may be that Virginia prosecutors find it unnecessary to rely on the torture sub-
element because the depravity of mind and aggravated battery sub-elements have been
judicially expanded such that practically every conceivable killing now falls within them. See
Banghart, supra at 81.
66. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1498 (7th ed. 1999).
67. Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 292 S.E.2d 798, 802 (Va. 1982) (holding that death




ity review, the court stated that "[t]he systematic torturing of [Fitzgerald's]
victim by slashing her with a machete and a knife, followed by comprehen-
sive mutilation, reflected relentless, severe, and protracted physical abuse
inflicted with brutality and ferocity of unparalleled atrociousness."69 Thus,
by considering only the defendant's conduct toward the victim during the
commission of the offense, the court found that this conduct amounted to
torture. 70 In light of Fitzgerald, it is not clear whether Virginia requires
proof of the defendant's purpose in order to constitute torture or whether
it is sufficient to show that the killing involved "physical abuse inflicted
with brutality and ferocity of unparalleled atrociousness. " 71 However, it is
dear that the relevant inquiry is into the actions of the defendant toward the
victim during the commission of the offense.
b. Depravity ofMind
Noting that "any act of murder arguably involves a 'depravityof mind'
and an 'aggravated battery to the victim,'" the Supreme Court of Virginia
has claimed to construe these sub-lements in a manner that prevents them
from being "tortured to mean that proof of an intentional killing is all the
proof necessary to establish [the vileness] circumstance."' Thus, the court
has construed depravity of mind to mean "a degree of moral turpitude and
sychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary
egal malice and premeditation."'" Not surprisingly, the court's effort to put
a limiting construction on the depravity of mind sub-element has failed. In
Poyner v. Commonwealth,74 the court expanded the depravity of mind sub-
element to include proof of psychological torture.7 F Furthermore, the
Supreme Court of Virginia's jurisprudence regarding the depravity of mind
sub-element has been characterized by a relentless and unceasing expansion.
It has become comm-'on for the Supreme Court of Virginia simply to recite
the facts of a case, find depravity of mind, and affirm the death sentence.7 6
69. Id. at 813.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978) (holding that Virginia's
aggravating circumstances are not unconstitutionally vague).
73. Id.
74.. 329 S.E.2d 815 (Va. 1985).
75. Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 815,832 (Va. 1985) (stating that psychologi-
cal torture "falls squarely within the ... definition" of depravity of mind).
76. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 1995). In that case, the
court held that "[executing two persons in their home and then stripping their bodies of
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Nonetheless, in spite of this ongoing expansion, it is clear that the depravity
of mind aggravator is based entirely upon the defendant's mental state.
Even in those cases in which the Supreme Court of Virginia has summarily
affirmed a finding of depravity of mind after reciting the facts of a killing,
the gruesome facts have apparently been used only to prove the defendant's
"psychical debasement" or "moral turpitude," both of which involve his
mental state at the time of the offense.
c. Aggravated Battery to the Victim
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Virginia has attempted, and failed, to
limit the aggravated battery sub-element to prevent it from becoming a
catch-all aggravating circumstance. In Smith v. Commonwealth,"8 the court
held that aggravated battery means "a battery which, qualitatively and
quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish
an act of murder."" However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has inter-
preted this language to include instances of "overkill," where the defendant,
for example, shoots the victim many times in rapid succession, ensuring that
death is not prolonged,0 and has indicated its willingness to find aggravated
battery in instances where at least some of the acts constituting the battery
did not occur until after the victim was already dead."1 In spite of this
expansion, it is well-established that an aggravated battery can only arise
from the defendant's conduct toward the victim during the commission of
the offense.
3. Evidence in Mitigation
Before a jury can recommend that a convicted capital murderer be
sentenced to death, it is required by law to consider evidence offered by the
defendant in mitigation of the offense.82 Section 19.2-264.4(B) provides that
jewelry and stealing their personal property manifestly demonstrates a depravity of mind."
Id. at 139.
77. See Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 149.
78. 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978).
79. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978) (holding that Virginia's
aggravating circumstances are not unconstitutionally vague).
80. See Gray v. Commonwealth, 356 S.E.2d 157, 180 (Va. 1987) (finding an aggravated
battery where the defendant shot the victim in the head several times in rapid succession).
81. See Whitelyv. Commonwealth, 286 S.E.2d 162,169 (Va. 1982) (declining to address
defendant's argument that the death penalty cannot be imposed unless aggravated battery is
proven by evidence of serious physical abuse before death.




[e]vidence which may be admissible, subject to the rules of evi-
dence governing admissibility, may include the circumstances
surrounding the offense, the history and background of the defen-
dant, and any other facts in mitigation of the offense. Facts in
mitigation may include, but shall not be limited to, the following:(i) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activ-
ity, (ii) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
(iii) the victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or
consented to the act, (iv) at the time of the commission of the
capital felony the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of'his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law was significantly impaired, (v) the age of the
defendant at the time of thle commission of the capital offense, or
(vi) mental retardation of the defendant."3
Thus, all mitigation evidence fits into one of two categories: either it
addresses the defendant's background and character or it addresses the
circumstances of the offense in a way that decreases the culpability of the
defendant." Unquestionably, the Commonwealth has the right to rebut the
defendant's mitigation evidence. This rebuttal evidence might demonstrate
that the defendant's character and background evidence was untrue, or that
it was not sufficient to overcome the aggravating circumstances. In the
alternative, this rebuttal evidence might involve the circumstances of the
offense that make the defendant more deserving of a death sentence. How-
ever, if a defendant's opportunity topresent mitigation evidence is limited
to these two categories of evidence, then the Commonwealth cannot rebut
the defendant's case in mitigation with evidence that does not fit into one
of these two categories."5
B. Victim Impact Evidence in the Virginia Code
1. The Victim Impact Statutes
Prior to 1998, the Virginia Code contained two important provisions
related to the use of victim impact evidence. These provisions permitted the
83. § 19.2-264.4(B).
84. For this reason, the Supreme Court of Virginia has repeatedly held that evidence
about the structure and security of prison life is not admissible as mitigation evidence because
it does not address the defendant's background or character, or the circumstances of the
offense. See Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 574 (Va. 1999); see also Cherrix v.
Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653 (Va. 1999). For further analysis, see Solomon, supra
note 54, at 71-73.
85. This fact makes Justice White's assertion in his Booth dissent that victim impact
evidence is relevant to "counteract" a defendant's mitigation evidence all the more cryptic.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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submission of victim impact statements to the court prior to the imposition
of sentence. Section 19.2-264.5 provided that
[w]hen the punishment of any person has been fixed at death, the
court shall, before im osing sentence, direct a probation officer of
the court to thoroughly investigate [sic] the history of the defen-
dant and any and aU-other relevant facts, to the end that the court
may be fully advised as to whether the sentence of death is appro-
priate and just. Reports shall be made, presented and filedi as
provided in S 19.2-299 except that, notwithstanding any other
provision of law, such reports shall in all cases contain a Vitim
Impact Statement. Such statement shall contain the same informa-
tion and be prepared in the same manner as Victim Impact State-
ments prepared pursuant to S 19.2-299.1. After consideration of
the report, and upon good cause shown, the court may set aside
the sentence of death and impose a sentence of imprisonment for
life.86
By its terms, section 19.2-264.5 applied only after a sentence of death had
been recommended by the jury. The content of the victim impact state-
ment permitted under this section was limited by section 19.2-299.1, which
stated that
[i]f prepared by someone other than the victim, [the statement)
shall (i) identify the victim, (ii) itemize any economic loss suffered
by the victim as a result of the offense, (iii) identify the nature and
extent of any physical or psychologcaL injury suffered by the
victim as a result of the olfense (iv) detail any change in the
victim's personal welfare lifestyfe or familial relations hips as a
result of hre offense, (v) identify any request for psychological or
medical services initiated by the victim or the victim's family as a
result of the offense, and (vi) provide such other information as
the court may require related to the impact of the offense upon
the victim.
s7
Recently, the General Assembly has added several provisions to the
Virginia Code in order to facilitate the use of victim impact evidence at
capital sentencing hearings. First, the General Assembly has expanded the
definition of a "victim" to include a spouse, child, parent, sibling or legal
guardian of a murdered individual.8 Second, the General Assembly added
86. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.5 (Michie 1998).
87. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-299.1 (Michie 1998).
88. See 2000 Va. Acts ch. 272 (adding the siblings of a murdered individual to the list
of statutory victims); see also VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-11.01(B) (Michie 2000) (including
siblings in the list of statutory victims). But see infra Part lfI(B)(2) for argument that the
children and siblings of a homicide victim do not qualify as statutory victims under S 19.2-
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subsection Al to section 19.2-264.4, which governs the capital sentencing
proceeding.89 The new subsection provides that
[i]n any proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, the court
shall perinit the victim, as defited in S 19.2-11.01, upon the mo-
tion of the attorney for the Commonwealth, and witl the consent
of the victim, to testify in the presence of the accused regarding
the impact of the offense upon the victim. The court shall limit
the victim's testimony to the factors set forth in clauses (i) through
(vi) of S 19.2-299.1.'
Thus, the Virginia Code expressly contemplates the use of victim
impact testimony at two separate stages of a capital trial. Subsection Al of
section 19.2-264.4, added in 1998, permits statutory victims to testify in
front of the judge or jury at the capital sentencing hearing. In addition,
section 19.2-264.5, which existed prior to 1998, permits the submission of
a victim impact statement to the court after a death sentence has been
recommended, but prior to the imposition of sentence. In either situation,
the scope of such evidence is limited by clauses (i) through (vi) of section
19.2-299. L91 The primary difference between the victim impact statement
permitted by section 19.2-264.5 and the victim impact testimony permitted
y section 19.2-264.4(A1) is that whereas the Supreme Court of Virginia has
held that the former was not limited to evidence obtained from the victims
identified in section 19.2-11.01,9 the latter is clearly limited by its own terms
to such victims.93
11.01.
89. 1998 Va. Acts ch. 485. In addition, the General Assembly added section 19.2-295.3,
which permits the admission of victim impact testimony subject to the limitations of % 19.2-
11.01 and 19.2-299.1 at the sentencing hearing of any felony conviction. Id. (enacting S 19.2-
295.3).
90. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A1) (Michie 2000).
91. Id.; VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.5 (Michie 2000); see § 19.2-299.1.
92. Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898, 905 (Va. 1997) (rejecting defendant's claim
that "by limiting the definition of 'victim' in the Act to the 'spouse, parent or legal guardian'
of the deceased, the legislature licitly intended to limit the admissibility of victim impact
evidence to that provided by such persons").
93. See S 19.2-264.4(A1) (stating "the court shall permit the victim, as defined in 5 19.2-
11.01 ... to testify in the presence of the accused") (emphasis added). This article focuses on
excluding victim impact evidence from the capital sentencing hearing. Presumably, the
consideration of this evidence by the judge prior to the imposition of sentence is less unfair
to the defendant because the judge or jury will already have considered the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and concluded that a death sentence is appropriate. For this reason,
the subsequent consideration of ,ictim impact testimony will be less prejudicial.
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2. Two Anomalies in the Virginia Code: Whly Siblings and Cbildren Are
Not Statutory Victims Under Section 19.2-11.01 (B)(iv)
On April 3, 2000, the Virginia General Assembly amended and reen-
acted section 19.2-11.01(B)(iv) of the Virginia Code to include the siblings
of persons killed by homicide in the list of statutory victims.9 Six days
later, on April 9, 2000, the General Assembly again amended section 19.2-
11.01, adding a new subsection giving statutory victims a right of notifica-
tion "of the filing and disposition of any appeal or habeas corpus proceeding
involving their case."" s In this version of section 19.2-11.01, however, the
General Assembly omitted "siblings" from subsection (B)(iv).' Thus, the
most recent version of section 19.2-11.01 enacted by the General Assembly
does not include the siblings of murdered persons as statutory victims.'
Nonetheless, section 19.2-11.01 as reproduced in the Code of Virginia states
that a statutory victim is "a spouse, parent, sibling or legal guardian of such
a person who ... was the victim of a homicide." For this reason, section
19.2-11.01 as it appears in the Code of Virginia is inconsistent with the
Virginia Acts of Assembly and may be an incorrect statement of law.
The Virginia Code Commission is authorized by law to "arrange for
the codification and incorporation into the Code of Virginia all general and
permanent statutes enacted" at regular and special sessions of the General
Assembly." The Commission is also authorized to make minor corrections
to the Code of Virginia when necessary." ° The Commission is not, how-
ever, authorized to alter the statutes enacted by the General Assembly and
contained in the Virginia Acts of Assembly in codifying and incorporating
the laws of the Commonwealth. Accordingly, the Code of Virginia should
yield to the Acts of Assembly when discrepancies exist between the two. In
this instance, because section 19.2-11.01 (B) (iv) as amended and reenacted by
the General Assembly on April 9, 2000, does not include siblings in the list
of statutory victims,' and because only statutory victims as defined in
section 19.2-11.01 are eligible to present victim impact evidence at a capital
94. 2000 Va. Acts ch. 272.
95. 2000 Va. Acts ch. 827.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-11.01(B)(iv) (Michie 2000) (emphasis added).
99. VA. CODE AN. S 9-77.9 (Michie 2000).
100. VA. CODE ANN. 5 9-77.10 (Michie 2000) (stating "[t]he Commission may correct
unmistakable printer's errors, misspellings and other unmistakable errors in the statutes as
incorporated into the Code of Virginia").
101. 2000 Va. Acts ch. 827.
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sentencing hearing,1 2 the siblings of homicide victims should not be permit-
ted to testify at capital sentencing hearings about the impact of the offense
upon them.
Regardless of whether one considers the Virginia Acts of Assembly or
the Code of Virginia, it is clear that the children of homicide victims are not
statutory victims as defined in section 19.2-11.01(B)(iv). In its entirety,
subsection (B) states as follows:
For purposes of this chapter, "victim" means (i) a person who has
suffered physical, psycliological or economic harm as a direct
result of the commission of a felony or of [one of eight enumer-
ated offenses], (ii) a spouse or child of such a person, .i) a parent
or legal guardian of such a person who is a minor, or (iv) a spouse,
parent, sibling or legal guardian of such a person who is physically
or mentally ificapacitated or was the victim of a homicide; how-
ever, "victim" does not mean a parent, child, spouse, sibling or
legal guardian who commits a felony or other enumerated crimi-
n offense against a victim as defined in clause (i) of this subsec-
tion.10'
Thus, a person who is a victim of a felony or other enumerated offense,
and that person's spouse and children, qualify as statutory victims under
clauses (i) and (ii) of section 19.2-11.01(B). If the victim of the felony or
other enumerated offense is a minor, then he, his parents, and his legal
guardians are statutory victims under clause (iii) of section 19.2-11.01(B).
However, if the victim of the felony or other enumerated offense is physi-
cally or mentally incapacitated, or if he was the victim of a homicide, then
only his spouse, parents, siblings and legal guardians qualify as statutory
victims under clause (iv) of section 19.2-11.01(B). For this reason, the
Commonwealth is not permitted to call the decedent's children to offer
victim impact testimony at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.'°
102. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A1) (Michie 2000) (stating "the court shall permit
the victim, as defined in 5 19.2.11.01 ... to testify in the presence of the accused") (emphasis
added).
103. S 19.2-11.01 (B) (emphasis in original). The most recent version of this statute in the
Virginia Acts of Assembly is identical except that it omits the word "sibling" from both
clause (iv) and from the fial clause of subsection(B) and that the word "victim" is not
italicized in the introductory clause. 2000 Va. Acts ch. 827.
104. Treating clauses (ii) through (iv) of S 19.2-11.01(B) as independent clauses is
supported by the fact that "parent" is included in clauses (iii) and Civ), but excluded from
clause (ii). Clearly, the General Assembly did not intend to include parents as statutory
victims unless the offense involved a minor, left the victim incapacitated, or resulted in his
death. By the same token, the General Assembly excluded children as statutory victims in
all such cases. Additional support for this reading is found in the fact that the General
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IV Argument. Excluding Victim Impact Evidence under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Due process is now the appropriate mechanism for the exclusion or
limitation of victim impact evidence.105 The Due Process Clause requires
the exclusion of victim impact evidence if its admission would render the
sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair."° Because fundamental fairness
can only be determined within the context of a given trial, challenges to the
admission of victim impact testimony after Payne will necessarily be fact-
intensive undertakings. Capital defense attorneys are urged to seek to
exclude or limit this evidence through the use of motions in limine and
aggressive pre-trial litigation.0 7 Part IV of this article seeks to make several
general points that should be incorporated into any effort to exclude the
Commonwealth's victim impact evidence.
In Beck v. Commonwealth,"~ the defendant, Christopher Beck ("Beck")
pleaded guilty to the capital murders of Florence Marie Marks, William
Miller and David Stuart Kaplan."° Because he had entered a guilty plea,
Beck was sentenced by the court."' Prior to the sentencing hearing, the
court received "a large number of letters from family members and friends
of the victims which contained statements concerning the impact of Beck's
crimes and 'recommendations' concerning the imposition of the death
penalty.""' At the sentencing hearing, the court heard evidence in aggrava-
Assembly included spouses in both clause (ii) and clause (iv), which would not make sense if
they were intended to be read in conjunction with one another, and in the final clause of S
19.2-11.01(B), which expressly excludes all five types of statutory victims if the would-be
statutory victim is the perpetrator of the offense.
105. See supra Part 11(B).
106. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991); see also id. at 831 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
107. The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse has drafted motions to exclude victim
impact evidence in several capital cases. Please contact the Clearinghouse at Washington and
Lee University School of Law for assistance in drafting such a motion in your capital case or
to obtain a copy of one of our motions.
108. 484 S.E.2d 898 (Va. 1997).
109. Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898,900 (Va. 1997). In addition, Beck pleaded
guilty to statutory burglary, rape, three offenses of robbery and seven firearms offenses. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Beck was decided in 1997, one year before the addition of subsection Al to S
19.2-264.4. Nonetheless, the trial court admitted and considered victim impact testimony at
the sentencing hearing. Another example of a court considering victim impact testimony
prior to 1998 is Weeks v. Commonwealtb, in which the court rejected defendant's claim that
"the trial court erred in admitting 'victim impact testimony' during the penalty phase of the
trial." Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379,389 (Va. 1994). These cases seem to indicate
that the 1998 amendments were largely nothing more than the codification of existing trial
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tion and in mitigation of the offenses, and eventually fixed punishment for
each of the three capital murders at death upon findings of future dangerous-
ness and vileness." Beck appealed his death sentences, asserting that the
judge should not have heard the victim impact evidence prior to conducting
the sentencing hearing.1
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the death sentences, rejecting
Beck's claim that the court improperly received victim impact statements
into evidence prior to and at the sentencing hearing. The court noted that
Beck had failed to raise any particularized objection to the admission of an2y
statement or testimony and "stress[ed] that this was a trial without a jury.
Under these circumstances, the court held that "the determination that this
evidence was relevant and probative of the issue under consideration was
clearly within the trial court's discretion."115 Significantly, the court stated
that "[a] judge, unlike a juror, is uniquely suited by training, experience and
judicial discipline to disregard potentially prejudicial comments and to
separate, during the mental process of adjudication, the admissible from the
inadmissible, even though he has heard both."'
Accordingly, defense attorneys should use Beck to illustrate that al-
though judges are able to separate the admissible from the inadmissible and
consider only the former, jurors are not. Therefore, the judge's role as gate-
keeper is never more crucial than it is at a capital sentencing hearing in front
of a jury. Due process requires trial judges to separate irrelevant or unfairly
prejudicial evidence from admissible evidence and ensure that only the latter
is submitted to the jury. In addition to Beck, defense attorneys should direct
trial judges' attention to Justice Souter's concurrence in Payne, in which he
emphasized "the trial judge's authority and responsibility to control the
proceedings consistently with due process.""" Having emphasized the
importance of the judge's role in guaranteeing the defendant a fair trial,
defense counsel will wish to move on to the points discussed in the subse-
quent sections of this article." 8
court practice.
112. Beck, 484 S.E.2d at 900.
113. Id. at 905.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 906.
116. Id. (quoting Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 279 S.E.2d 155, 157 (Va. 1981)).
117. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 836 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
118. See infra Parts IV(A) and IV(B).
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A. The Commonwealth's Victim Impact Evidence Will Be Less Relevant
Than That Offered in Payne
Defense counsel must first argue that victim impact evidence is not
relevant in the context of a Virginia capital sentencing hearing, because it
does not address any of the facts that are relevant to the Virginia aggravating
or mitigating circumstances. The facts relevant to the future dangerousness
aggravator are the past conduct of the defendant and the circumstances of
the offense. 9 The facts relevant to the torture sub-element are the defen-
dant's conduct toward the victim during the commission of the offense and
(arguably) the defendant's substantive mental state at that time.' These are
also the facts relevant to the depravity of mind sub-element.' 2' Only the
defendant's conduct toward the victim during the commission of the offense
is relevant to the aggravated battery sub-element.' Finally, the only facts
relevant to mitigation or rebuttal of mitigation are the character and back-
ground of the defendant, and the circumstances of the offense.' Therefore,
because it does not address the past conduct of the defendant, the circum-
stances of the offense, the defendant's conduct toward the victim, the
defendant's mental state, or the defendant's character or background, victim
impact evidence is not relevant to any of the issues of fact presented in the
capital sentencing context in Virginia.
Thus far, the Supreme Court of Virginia has refused to accept the
rather obvious conclusion that victim impact evidence is rarely, if ever,
relevant at a capital sentencing hearing. In Weeks v. Commonwealth,'24 the
court rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court's admission of this
evidence was erroneous. 2" The court held that victim impact testimony is
relevant to punishment in a capital murder prosecution in Virginia."'tz In
support of this dubious conclusion, the court stated only that
under Virinia's modem, bifurcated capital procedure, victim
impact evidence is probative, for example, of the depravity of
mind component of the vileness predicate, which the jury in this
case found as a basis for imposing the death penalty. As the Su-
preme Court said in Payne, "for the jury to assess meaningfully
the defendant's moral cilpability and blameworthiness, it should
119. See supra Part M(A)(1).
120. See supra Part II(A)(2)(a).
121. See supra Part l(A)(2)(b).
122. See supra Part II(A)(2)(c).
123. See supra Part TIT(A)(3).
124. 450 S.E.2d 379 (Va. 1994).




have before it at the sentencing7phase evidence of the specific
.harm caused by the defendant."
This is the only time that the Supreme Court of Virginia has identified a
provision of the Virginia Code to which victim impact is relevant. In light
of the foregoing analysis, it is abundantly clear that the court was wrong in
asserting that victim impact evidence is relevant to depravity of mind.
Therefore, defense counsel should continue to argue that victim impact
evidence is not relevant in cases involving future dangerousness, torture or
aggravated battery. In addition, defense counsel should challenge the faulty
holding of Weeks by insisting that victim impact evidence is not relevant to
depravity of mind because it does not address the conduct of the defendant
during the offense or the defendant's mental state at the time of the comis-
sion of the offense.
B. The Commonwealth's Victim Impact Evidence Will Be More Unfairly
Prejudicial Than That Offered in Payne
After demonstrating that victim impact evidence is not relevant,
defense counsel should also argue that its prejudicial effect would be great,
127. Id. at 390 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)). This is a perfect
example of how the Supreme Court of Virginia has manipulated Payne in order to avoid
undertaking its own analysis of the relevance of victim impact evidence in the Virginia capital
sentencing procedure. First, the court blithely announces that victim impact evidence is
relevant to depravity of mind without explaining how this evidence is relevant. In point of
fact, it is not. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. Second, the court quotes Payne
out of context in an extremely, manipulative way. In its entirety, the portion of Payne quoted
by the Weeks court is: "We are now of the view that a State mayproperly conclude that for the
jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should
have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant."
Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (emphasis added). Thus, by truncating the Payne quote, the Supreme
Court of Virginia made it appear as though the United States Supreme Court had admon-
ished the states that they should put victim impact evidence in front of the jury, when in fact
the Court had merely stated that the States are not forbidden from drawing this conclusion.
Presumably, Virginia could make the "specific harm caused by the defendant" relevant to
capital sentencing by enacting an aggravating circumstance based upon the harm caused by
the capital offense. However, Virginia has not done so. Furthermore, any harm-based
aggravating circumstance would be subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny under the
vagueness standard established by Godfrey. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality
opinion). See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
Simply put, until such time as a harm-based aggravator is enacted, victim impact
evidence is irrelevant. The General Assembly cannot make victim impact evidence relevant
to future dangerousness or vileness simply by legislating its admission any more than the
General Assembly can make any other irrelevant fact relevant simply by statutorily authoriz-
ing its admission. By definition, irrelevant evidence has no probative value. In addition, this
particular type of irrelevant evidence is unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. See infra Part
IV(B). For this reason, its admission is fundamentally unfair and is prohibited by due process.
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and its admission would be fundamentally unfair. In support of this point,
counsel should draw two distinctions from the evidence admitted in Payne.
First, counsel should emphasize the brevity of the evidence admitted in
Payne. Anything more than the most cursory victim impact statement will
be more prejudicial than the single statement in Payne.!' Second, counsel
should demonstrate that, unlike that in Payne, the Commonwealth's victim
impact testimony will not merely replicate evidence that the jury will
already have heard in the course of the trial. This will necessarily involve
close scrutiny of the available victim impact evidence on a case-by-case basis.
In many cases, unlike Payne, the statutory victim will not have testified at
the guilt phase of the trial because he will not have been a percipient witness
to the offense;-" thus, the jury will not ordinarily be "unavoidably familiar"
with the impact of the crime upon the statutory victim.'" This fact also
makes most victim impact evidence more prejudicial than that of which
Payne approved.
In addition to distinguishing the Payne testimony, defense counsel must
be prepared to articulate the unfair prejudice that will result from the
admission of victim impact evidence at the sentencing hearing. The highly
emotional and visceral nature of this type of testimony must be emphasized.
Counsel should also mention the likelihood that this evidence will trigger
a reaction in the jury that is not logically related to the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances of the offense. In addition, defense counsel should
assert that the admission of victim impact evidence will confuse the jury by
focusing its attention on an irrelevant collateral issue. Furthermore, counsel
128. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
129. Here one must carefully distinguish testimony about the impact of an offense upon
a percipient witness from testimony about the occurrence of a prior offense or bad act. For
example, injomson v. Comrmoalth, two witnesses testified at a capital sentencing hearing
that the defendant had previously raped them. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769,
776 (Va. 2000) (affirming defendant's death sentence). This was not victim impact testimony;
nor could these two witnesses have testified about the impact of these prior rapes upon them.
Section 19.2-264.4 requires a sentencing hearing to be held "[uipon a finding that the defen-
dant is guilty of an offense which may be punishable by death." VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4
(Michie 2000). Subsection A Iof section 19.2-264.4 states that "[i]n any proceeding conducted
pursuant to this section, the court shall permit the victim ... to testify... regarding the
impact of the offense upon the victim." VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(Al) (Michie 2000)
(emphasis added). In this context, "the offense" can only refer to the "offense which may be
punishable by death," and therefore victim impact evidence is limited to the impact of that
offense upon the statutory victims. Accordingly, victims of prior bad acts may be permitted
to testify that these acts occurred, but they cannot testify about the impact of these acts upon
them. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-295.3 (Michie 2000) (stating that "upon a fin d g
that the defendant is guilty of a felony, the court shall permit the victim... to testify...
regarding the impact of the offense upon the victim*) (emphases added).
130. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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must explain there is a strong risk that the jury will overestimate the persua-
sive force of this evidence; because they will sympathize with the surviving
victims, the jurors will be unable to assess objectively the future dangerous-
ness of the defendant and the vileness of the offense.
V Kasi v. Commonwealth: The Supreme Court of Virginia Continues to
Treat Due Process Cavalierly
In Kasi v. Commonwealth,' the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
the death sentence of Mir Aimal Kasi ("Kasi")."' Kasi had been convicted
of capital murder for the killings of Frank Darling and Lansing Bennett "as
part of the same act or transaction."' Both of the slain victims, and several
other wounded victims, were agents of the Central Intelligence Agency.'
On direct appeal, Kasi raised several issues, including a claim that the admis-
sion of victim impact evidence at his sentencing hearing was fundamentally
unfair.' The court's treatment of this claim was so cursory that it will be
quoted here in its entirety.
Next, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his
motion to "preclude" the testimony of Frank Darling's wife ii the
penalty phase after she had testified during the guilt phase of the
trial. Defendant argues, "In this instance, calling for the second
time the murder victim s wife to give victim impact testimony
violates "the due process standard of fundamental fairness." Wedo not agree.Mrs. Dar.ing was a front-seat passenger in the automobile driven
by her husband at the time of his murder. She testified during the
guilt phase about the events surrounding the shootings. During
the penalty phase, she testified only about the substantial impact
of her husband's murder upon her life. This is the type of victim
impact testimony approvedin Payne v. Tennessee, and in Weeks,
and the trial court correctly refused to exclude it.13
Kasi is yet another example of the Supreme Court of Virginia sum-
marily affirming the use of victim impact testimony without stating any
theory of relevance. The court simply cites Payne and Weeks as if they settle
131. 508 S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1998).
132. Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57, 68 (Va. 1998).
133. Id. at 59. Subsection 7 of the capital murder statute dassifies "[t]he willful, deliber-
ate and premeditated killing of more than one person as a part of the same act or transaction"
as capital murder. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(g Mchie 2000).
134. Kasi, 508 S.E.2d at 59.
135. Id. at 65.
136. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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the issue, even though neither case addressed in any meaningful way the
relevance of victim impact testimony in the Virginia capital sentencing
scheme.1 37 Furthermore, Kasi does not even mention the prejudicial effect
of this evidence. This casual treatment of victim impact evidence simply
does not comport with the constitutional mandate of fundamental
fairness.3
The Supreme Court of Virini a's misuse of Payne in both Kasi and
Weeks almost certainly predicts how it will react when confronted with
future challenges to victim impact evidence. However, this is not a reason
for defense counsel to permit this evidence to be introduced unop posed. Asnoted by Justice Souter in his Payne concurrence, trial jud have a "re-
sponsibility to control theproceedings consistently with due o s.
Thus, the absence of any real threat ofreversal from the Supreme Court of
Virginia should not be the end of the inquiry; trial judges must still seek to
ensure that capital defendants receive trials that are fundamentally fair.
Furthermore, because due process claims are always made pursuant to the
United States Constitution, appeal to federal courts will always be possible,
provided that the issue is litigated throughout the appellate process so as to
avoid procedural default."4 When these challenges are heard by courts that
care to uphold fundamental concepts such as relevance and fairness, it will
not be enough simply to hide behind Payne. These courts will, at mini-
mum, force the Commonwealth to articulate the relevance of victim impact
evidence to its capital sentencing scheme and assess the prejudicial effect of
the specific testimony offered in a given case.
V1. Conclusion
Payne v. Tennessee represented a radical change in the United States
Supreme Court's treatment of victim impact evidence. In that case, the
Court abandoned its prior interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, which
137. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also supra note 127 and accompanying
text.
138. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. In spite of the analytical deficiencies
of Kasi, defense counsel should expect the Commonwealth to invoke it in opposition to any
effort to limit or exclude victim impact testimony. When this hap pens, defense counsel can
argue that, like Payne, Kasi involved evidence about the impact of the offense upon a ercipi-
ent witness. Mrs. Darling witnessed the killing of her husband and testified at the guilt phase
of the trial. Kasi, 508 S.E.2d at 65. Therefore, the jury was "unavoidably familiar with the
impact of the offense upon her, and the prejudicial effect of her victim impact testimony was
diminished. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. Kasi can be distinguished on this
ground.
139. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 836 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
140. See Ashley Flynn, Procedural Default: A De Facto Exception to Civility?, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 289, 297-301 (2000) (discussing the myriad objections that must be made at trial in
order to preserve the record and avoid procedural default).
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had prohibited the admission of victim impact evidence in capital cases.
However, contrary to statements of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Payne
did not eliminate all constitutional barriers to the admission of victim
impact evidence. In fact, all six Justices in the Payne majority expressly
acknowledged a due process limit on victim impact evidence when it renders
the sentencing procedure fundamentally unfair. Three of these Justices
concluded that the testimony in Payne was not fundamentally unfair because
of its brevity and because it was merely cumulative of prior testimony.
Virginia capital defense attorneys can seek to exclude or limit victim
impact testimony by invoking the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and arguing that its admission would be fundamentally unfair.
In support of this argument, defense counsel can illustrate that victim
impact evidence is not relevant to any of Virginia's aggravating or mitigating
circumstances because it does not address the background or character of the
defendant, the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's conduct toward
the victim during the commission of the offense, or the defendant's mental
state. In addition, defense counsel can demonstrate that the Common-
wealth's victim impact evidence in a given case will be more prejudicial than
that of Payne because it will be quantitatively greater and because it will not
be merely cumulative. Finally, defense counsefcan arge that victim impact
evidence will confuse the issues, mislead the jury, and improperly prey upon
the jurors' emotions.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has recognized that trial judges, unlike
jurors, are uniquely able to separate admissible evidence from unfairly
prejudicial evidence. Thus, it is incumbent upon trial judges to recognize
and exclude irrelevant and prejudicial evidence before it is presented to the
jury. By demonstrating that the admission of victim impact evidence would
be fundamentally unfair, defense attorneys can argue that the United States
Constitution requires the exclusion of this evidence, even though the
Virginia Code endorses its admission. This type of effective advocacy is
likely to result in several benefits for capital defendants. First, a challenge
to the admission of victim impact evidence is likely to result in the exclusion
of at least some of this evidence at the trial level. Second, it will preserve a
constitutional issue for appeal in the federal courts. By choosing to treat
victim impact as a due process issue, the Supreme Court has created a
constitutional issue that will have to be litigated on a case-by-case basis.
Third, the irrelevance of victim impact evidence is a non-frivolous issue that
defense counsel can raise in a motion in limine as part of a comprehensive
strategy to encourage the Commonwealth to engage in the process of plea
bargaining. For all of these reasons, defense attorneys are strongly encour-
aged to test the due process limits on the admissibility of victim impact
evidence.
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